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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative Agency Bears Laches Burden of Proof When
Hospital Asserts Analogous Statute of Limitations In
Administrative Hearings
The Court of Appeal of California, Second District, held in
administrative hearings concerning financial reimbursements the
burden of proof as to laches transfers to the Administrative Agency!
The court held the hospital may "borrow" an analogous statute of
limitations to assert doctrine of laches.2
Medi-Cal is the state program responsible for distributing federal
Medicaid monies to healthcare facilities throughout the state.3 The
State Department of Health Services (Department) is the agency
responsible for the administration of the Medi-Cal program.4 In 1994,
plaintiff hospital received a revised final reimbursement settlement for
the fiscal years 1981, 1982, and 1983 from the Department.' The
Department alleged calculating errors had been made and plaintiff had
been overpaid $1,265,440.6 Plaintiff requested an administrative
adjustment, and in October 1996 the parties agreed the Department
would receive $470,571 unless an administrative hearing barred
recovery through a statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches.7
In February 1997, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held the
plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing prejudice or unnecessary
delay, the tvo requirements under the doctrine of laches.8 Plaintiff
filed a petition for mandamus preventing the Department from
recovering the mistaken Medi-Cal payments? The superior court
denied the petition and plaintiff appealed.' 0
'See Fountain Valley Hosp. and Regional Medical Ctr. v. Director of the State Dep't of
Health Serv., 89 Cal. App. 2d 139, 146 (1999).
2See id
3See id. at 141.
4See id
5See id. at 142.
6See Fountain Valley Hosp., 89 Cal. App. 2d at 142.7See id. at 143.
sSee id.
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The court held a defense under the doctrine of laches barring an
administrative agency's recovery may be asserted in two ways: 1) the
party arguing in favor of laches bears the burden of proof or 2) if there
is a statute of limitations in an analogous case and that statute has been
exceeded, the elements are presumed and the burden transfers to the
other party to prove the delay was not unreasonable and the party
asserting laches was not prejudiced." The court held the application of
the rule for borrowing periods of limitations shifted the laches burden
of proof to the agency.P2 The case was reversed and remanded to the
trial court with directions to remand to the ALJ to determine whether
the Department had met the burden of proof.13 Fountain Valley Hosp.
and Regional Medical Ctr. v. Director of the State Dep't of Health
Serv., 89 Cal. App. 2d 139 (1999).
BANKRUPTCY
Failure to Include Medical Malpractice Cause of Action On
Schedule of Assets Bars Patient From Pursuing
Action On Own Behalf
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third
Department, reversed the state Supreme Court's denial of physician's
motion that patient had lacked capacity to sue.14
In Jul 1991, plaintiff was treated for a cancerous tumor near her
pancreas.' She developed pancreatitis that did not respond to
treatment by defendant physician, and was transferred to another
facility where she underwent further medical treatment, including
surgery, and subsequently recovered.' 6  In July 1992, plaintiff
consulted with two law firms regarding a possible medical malpractice
9See id.
'°See id.
"See Fountain Valley Hosp., 89 Cal. App. 2d at 144.
'
2See id. at 145.
"See id at 146.
"aSee Hansen v. M. Madani, 693 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (1999).
"See id. at 333.
16See id.
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claim against defendant. 17  In April 1993, when plaintiff was
discharged in bankruptcy, the schedule of assets did not include any
reference to the medical malpractice suitis In February 1994, plaintiff
filed a malpractice claim seeking damages from defendant's care in
July 1991.79 In 1998, defendant, after becoming aware of patient's
prior bankruptcy claim, amended his answer, moving to dismiss due to
patient's lack of capacity to sue as an affirmative defense.20 Plaintiff
reopened the bankruptcy case and filed an amended schedule of assets,
including the medical malpractice claim, and moved to dismiss the
defendant's affirmative defense of lack of capacity.
21
The state supreme court granted plaintiffs motion and denied
defendant's motion stating the plaintiffs lack of capacity "had been
cured."22 The court reversed that decision finding plaintiffs failure to
include a malpractice claim barred pursuing this action.23 This was true
even after the filing of the amended schedule because the claim would
be the property of the bankruptcy trustee, not the plaintifft24 The court
also noted a substitution of the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff would
still have left the incapacity.25 Hansen v. M Madani, 693 N. Y.S.2d 332
(1999).
17See id.
"
8See id.
'
9See Hansen, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 333.
20See id21See id
2See id
23See id at 334.
24See Hansen, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
2See id
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DAMAGES
Under Management Services Agreements Between Hospitals,
Hospital Two Employees, Acting Under Management of Hospital
One, Are Not Vicariously Liable For First Hospital One's Alleged
EMTALA Violations
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
granted summary judgment on behalf of one hospital (Hospital Two)
holding another hospital's (Hospital One) employees were not
subagents of Hospital Two.26 Hospital One had not agreed to assume
primary responsibility for them, therefore Hospital Two was not
vicariously liable for Hospital One's alleged Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) violations."
On March 6, 1998 plaintiff presented her twenty-month-old
daughter to Hospital One's emergency room because the child was
crying, running a fever, and having difficulty breathing.28 Plaintiff was
refused treatment and told she would need to make payment on past
medical bills before her daughter could receive medical attention.
29
Hospital One claimed these events never occurred and plaintiff was
never present at its facility on the day in question.3°  Plaintiff
subsequently filed a claim against both hospitals for alleged EMTALA
violations concerning the March 6, 1998 incident.31 Hospital Two was
included in the claim because the two hospitals had a management
services agreement that provided an employee from Hospital Two to
act as a management agent at Hospital One.32 On March 6, 1998 a
Hospital Two employee was the acting administrator at Hospital One.
33
26See Zeigler v. Elmore County Health Care Auth., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1338 (N.D. Ala.
1999). 27See id.
2'See id at 1335-36.29See id. at 1336.30See id3
'See Zeigler, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.32See id at 1336.33See id
[V/ol. 3:609
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Plaintiff had never been to Hospital Two and Hospital Two did not
own or operate medical facilities in the same county as Hospital One?4
The court granted Hospital Two's motion for summary judgment since
plaintiff had never requested medical treatment at its facility and it
could not be found to have denied her any medical treatment. Zeigler
v. Elmore County Health Care Auth., 56 F. Stipp. 2d 1334 1338
(N.DAl 1999).
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Summary Judgment Reversed In Favor of Plaintiff Because
Negligent Supervision of Hospital Employee Involved Policies
Regarding Employee's Access to Hospital Property Used In
Perpetration of Assault
The Court of Appeals of Texas reversed a trial court's decision granting
final summary judgment in favor of defendant hospital district 36 The
Court reversed and remanded the questions of negligence to the jury
because the plaintiff patient sufficiently alleged an injury arising from
defendant's use of hospital's property.37  Furthermore, plaintiff
sufficiently alleged her injuries arose because of the employment of the
incompetent employee, and were job related.38
The plaintiff brought a negligence action against defendant
hospital after an employee of the defendant sexually assaulted her
during a breast examination 39  The hospital argued the state Tort
Claims Act barred recovery for the intentional tort of an employee.40 It
also argued the employee was not acting within the scope of his
employment when the assault occurred.41 Finally, defendant hospital
3See iii
35See id.
36See Hendrix v. Bexar County Hosp. Dist, No. 04-98-00833-CV, 2000 WL 36098, at
*1 ( . Dec. 30, 1999).
See id. at *5.
3SSee id. at *6.
39See iii at * 1.40See ia41See Hendrix, 2000 WL 36098, at *1.
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contended the plaintiff did not establish that the use or misuse of
tangible property was the proximate cause of the damages the plaintiff
alleged, and the hospital was immune, according to state statute, from
allegations regarding hospital policies that are discretionary according
to state statute."
The court stated under the state Tort Claims Act, the plaintiff must
allege an injury arising under the use of property, and the use of such
property must be the proximate cause of her injury.43 The court held
the plaintiff sufficiently alleged an injury causally related to the use of
government property." In this case, the plaintiff was lured to the
hospital examining room by a hospital employee using the hospital
public address system. 45 Furthermore, the employee was wearing a
hospital lab coat.46  Finally, the assault occurred on a hospital exam
table, while the plaintiff was wearing a hospital gown. 47 The claims of
negligent supervision were related to hospital policies regarding
hospital property.48 The court noted it was unlikely this assault could
have occurred had the employee not had such access to hospital
property.49 The court also held there was some connection between the
plaintiff's injury and the employment of the incompetent employee.50
The court noted because the defendant serves patients it has a high duty
in the hiring, training and supervising of its employees.5' The duty to
conduct criminal investigations of the hospital employees should be
standard.52 Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case to
the lower court, finding the question of fact regarding proximate cause
needed to be determined by a jury.53 Hendrix v. Bexar County Hosp.
Dist., No. 04-98-00833-CV, 2000 WL 36098 at *1 (Tex. Dec. 30, 1999).
42See id
43See id. at *2.
44See id at *4.45See id46See Hendrix, 2000 WL 36098, at *4.47See id. at * 2.48See id. at * 5.49See i d at *4.
'
0See id at *6.
51See id
52See Hendrix, 2000 WL 36098, at *6.
53See id
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Employer Policy Does Not Violate Pregnancy Discrimination
Act Where No Prima Facie Case of Disparate
Treatment or Disparate Impact
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
granting of summary judgment for defendant employer on plaintiff's
claim of discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA).54 Plaintiff employee claimed disparate treatment and disparate
impact discrimination because of her pregnancy.
5 5
Appellant, a certified nurse's assistant was required to perform a
substantial amount of lifting and repositioning of patients as a primary
responsibility of her position.5 6 Once she discovered she was pregnant,
she requested she become exempt from the lifting responsibilities of
her job.5 7 However, defendant's policy specified only employees who
suffered a job-related injury would be excused from meeting their
responsibilities.5 8 As a result, plaintiff was terminated, yet rehired one
year later.5
9
Under the PDA, appellant claimed two types of discrimination as a
result of her termination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.
60
Unlike disparate treatment, a disparate impact claim does not require
appellant to provide intentional discrimination evidence.6 1 To prove
disparate treatment discrimination, direct evidence of the employer's
intent to discriminate is necessary.
62
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, four
requirements must be met: employee is part of a protected group
according to Title VII, employee is qualified for the position, employee
suffered adversely, and employee experienced a differential application
of work rules.63 Appellant failed to prove she was qualified and she
54See Spivey v. Beverly Enter. Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1314 (1Ith Cir. 1999).55See id at 1311.
S'See id at 1311.
"'See id
5sSee id9See Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1311, 1312.
6See id at 1312.
61See id
62See id
6'See id
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experienced a differential application of work rules. 64  Because
appellant could not perform a primary responsibility of her job, she was
no longer qualified for that position.6 5 Appellant argued had she been
provided an accommodation, she would have been able to perform her
job.66 However, the employer was not required to make any
accommodations to pregnant employees, only to those who were
injured on the job.67
Furthermore, appellant did not prove she suffered from a
differential application of work rules.68  The employer only offered
modification to those injured on the job.6 9 The court decided to adhere
to the Fifth Circuit's precedent: it is not an infraction of PDA if
employers only assign light duty to employees injured on the job, not to
pregnant employees.70 Instead pregnant employees must be treated like
every other employee not injured on the job.'
Additionally, appellant failed to establish her disparate impact
claim.72 To prove such a claim, the appellant must establish the
particular employment practice alleged to have caused disparate
impact.73  Second, appellant must provide statistical evidence to
demonstrate causation that the alleged behavior resulted in disparate
impact discrimination.74
Appellant successfully fulfilled the first requirement by alleging
pregnant employees were discriminated against by the modified duty
policy.75 However, appellant did not provide any statistical evidence
illustrating a disparate impact on pregnant employees.76 Thus, because
appellant did not prove a primafacie case of either disparate impact or
64See Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313.
6
'See id at 1312.66See id
67See id.
6Ssee id. at 1313.
69See Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313.70See id71See id
72See id. at 1313.
73See id. at 1314.
74See Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313.
75See i d
76See id. at 1314.
[Vol. 3:609
CASE BRIEFS
treatment, the appellee's summary judgment was granted..7 Sphey V.
Beverly Enter. Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999).
EXPERT WITNESS
Plaintiff Must Use Expert Witness to Establish Standard
of Care For Treatment of Bedsore
The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld summary judgment in favor of
defendant, a skilled nursing facility, in a negligence action alleging
improper treatment of a bedsore that became a severe coccyx ulcer.8
The court considered both the facility's treatment of the bedsores and
its attempts to prevent the sores.79 It held a jury could not determine
the standard of care without an expert witness, which plaintiff had
failed to provide.8"
Plaintiff, a fifty-year-old quadriplegic, had been a patient at the
facility for six years when bedsores began.8' The facility treated the
sores with prescription ointment, sixteen visits by an enterostomal
therapy nurse and use of a special air flotation cushion-82 Doctors and
nurses sought to change plaintiff's position every two hours. 3 Medical
notes documented he refused, although his preferred position
aggravated the ulcer.84 Surgery and sdn grafts were required to close
the ulcer, which then healed." Staff from the skilled nursing facility
filed affidavits in support of defendant's motion for summary
judgment, indicating plaintiff's refusal to cooperate with what they
asserted was the correct standard of care.86
7TSee idl
7See Thompson v. Embassy Rehabilitation and Care Ctr., 604 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa
2000)'79ee id.
s°See id. at 646.
"'See id
'See id. at 644.
'3See Thompson, 604 N.W.2d at 644.
4See id. at 644-45.
8SSee id. at 645
g6See id.
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The court determined from interrogatories and a deposition that
plaintiff did not have an expert witness who could testify as to the
required standard of care for his bedsores.87 It applied the test:
If all the primary facts can be accurately and intelligibly
described to the jury, and if they, as [persons] of common
understanding, are as capable of comprehending the primary
facts and of drawing correct conclusions from them as are
witnesses possessed of special or peculiar training,
experience, or observation in respect of the subject under
investigation, [expert testimony is not required].,8
The court upheld the motion for summary judgment on the basis
defendant had shown plaintiff lacked a material element in his case
because he did not provide expert testimony to establish the correct
standard of care.89 Although a jury could have determined whether the
facility was negligent in not repositioning plaintiff to prevent bedsores,
his refusal to cooperate put this issue beyond the jury's understanding
and therefore required expert testimony.90  Thompson v. Embassy
Rehabilitation and Care Ctr., 604 N. W.2d 643 (Iowa 2000).
Expert Witness Not Required in Battery Claim
Because the Psychological Injury Was Clearly
Caused by the Doctor's Battery
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a lower court's directed
verdict, which held a medical expert was necessary in order to prevail
in an informed consent case grounded in battery.91 The plaintiff,
though he could still have sexual intercourse, suffered from premature
ejaculation and partial loss of erection, and thus visited the defendant
physician.92 The defendant determined surgery to clean out blockage
7S5ee id. at 646.
"
8See Thompson, 604 N.W.2d at 646.
See id.
9°See id.
91See Montgomery v. Sehgal, 742 A.2d 1125, 1136 (Penn. Dec. 9, 1999).
92See id. at * 2.
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was necessary.93 However, the defendant inserted a prosthesis into the
plaintiff without his approval.94
The plaintiff brought claims for lack of informed consent
grounded in battery and negligence.95 The appeal only concerned the
battery claim.96 The plaintiff claimed he felt like a "machine," was
embarrassed by the device, and the device had hindered the relationship
between he and his wife.97 He argued he did not need to present expert
medical testimony that the unwanted procedure performed by the
defendant caused the physical and mental symptoms he alleged.93 The
court agreed with the plaintiff, holding in a battery claim the need for
expert testimony was not required.99 All that was needed to be proven
by the plaintiff in order to submit the testimony to the jury, was the fact
the defendant implanted the prosthesis into the plaintiff; and such
contact was unpermitted and intentional.100 There was no dispute the
defendant implanted the device without permission. 10' Furthermore,
the claims for mental anguish, which are compensatory, can be
received for direct, obvious, and foreseeable results of the injury, even
in the absence of expert medical testimony.10
2
The court stated the unpermited insertion of the device would
obviously cause mental anguish, surprise, and embarrassment.
0 3
Furthermore, such a result was direct, foreseeable, and not complex.
104
Therefore, the lower court's decision was reversed because expert
testimony was not required and the case should have been presented to
a jury.105 Montgomery v. Sehgal, (Penn. Dec. 9, 1999) (1999 Pa. Super.
304).
9'See id at* 3.
94See id at *4.
95See id
96See Montgomery, 742 A.2d at *6.
97See id at *4.
98See id at *5.
99See id at *9.
'0See id at*10.
'
01See Montgomery, 742 A.2d at *12.
1 2 See id at*18.
'
03See i d at *20.
'"4See id
'
05See id at *21.
2000]
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HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZTION
No Broad Duty to Disclose Physician Incentive Plans to
Participants Imposed on Health Maintenance Organizations
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA) did not impose
upon a health maintenance organization (HMO) a duty to disclose
physician incentive plans.1
0 6
Plaintiffs brought action in 1997 against defendant HMO,
claiming the HMO breached its fiduciary duty to act solely in the
interests of its members.'0 7 Specifically, plaintiffs claimed the HMO
had a duty to disclose it maintained financial incentive arrangements.
08
These incentives, plaintiffs argued, were not within the best interests of
patients since they encouraged physicians to minimize health care,
testing, and referrals.1 9
The court found there did not exist a broad duty to disclose
incentive plans since such a duty is not expressly stated in ERISA."10
Such an implied duty would be illogical because ERISA does provide
for other express duties, such as the duty to summarize material
provisions of the plan.111 The court found this absence to be intentional
on the part of the drafters.1 2  The court further refused to accept
plaintiffs' argument that the duty to disclose incentive plans exists even
in the absence of a specific inquiry or special circumstance." 3 The
court, however, did not address the question of what duty would exist
had there been such a specific inquiry.'1 4 Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found
Health Plan of Texas 198 F.3d 552, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2000).
1°68ee Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Texas 198 F. 3d 552, 556-57 (5th Cir.
2000).0IO7See id at 554.
'"°See id
'09See id
"°See id at 555.
."See Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 555-56.
112See I d
"3See id
"
4See id
[Vol. 3:609
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INFORMED CONSENT
An Objective Standard on the Causation Issue in Informed
Consent Medical Malpractice is Correct
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a lower court's ruling,
which held the objective standard is appropriate in evaluating the
causation issue in medical malpractice informed consent cases.1 5 The
lower court had reversed the trial court's decision granting a directed
verdict in favor of defendant physician.116 During the trial there was
conflicting testimony regarding what the patient would have done had
she been fully informed of the dangers of her treatment.11 7 Thus, the
trial court struck the testimony and directed verdict was granted on the
informed consent claim.1 '
The patient, who was paralyzed after receiving radiation
treatment, argued a subjective standard should be employed when
evaluating informed consent cases. 119 A subjective standard would be
established only by patient testimony. 120  Under this standard the
patient would need to prove she would not have consented to the
radiation had she been told of the risk of paralysis. 21 Thus, the
credibility of the patient's testimony would be what the jury would use
to decide liability. 122 The objective standard measures what a prudent
person in the patient's situation would have decided. if the information
had been disclosed.'2 The court held the objective test was the correct
standard to use in determining informed consent cases.
124
The court found the objective approach superior because it
circumvented the need to make the jury decide whether a speculative,
"
5See Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assoc., No. M1997-00036-SC-RI I-CV, 1999 Tenn.
LEXIS 685, at *15 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999).
" See a at*1.
"
7See id at*4.
"See id
"
9See id at*7.
lZSee Ashe 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 685, at *8.
121See id
'22See i d
'
2 3See id at*10.124See id at * 13.
20001
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and possibly emotional answer to a hypothetical question should
conclude the outcome of the case.12 5 Furthermore, the court reasoned
by comparing the conduct of the patient with a reasonable person in
like circumstances, the jury could also give weight to the patient's
testimony and the characteristics of the patient. 126
Finding the jury should have been allowed to decide whether a
reasonable person in the patient's situation would have chosen the
treatment if the risk had been disclosed, the court affirmed the reversal
of the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial
consistent with the application of the objective test on the causation
issue. 127 Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assoc., No. M1997-00036-SC-
R11-CV, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 685 (Tenn. Dec. 27, 1999).
INSURANCE
A Health Benefit Claim Involving a Workers' Compensation
Claim Does Not Have to Adhere to the Same Laws
as Health Claims Alone
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held health claims that are
pending an investigation of a worker's compensation claim are exempt
from a state law mandating payment in thirty days.
1 28
In February of 1996, Philip Lunz, who worked at Frederick
Memorial Hospital, hurt his back while on the job.' 29 He then filed a
claim with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission. 130 The
insurance company for the hospital in turn filed an "issue" contesting
Lunz's claim.) 1
Lunz went to see an Orthopedic specialist, and surgery was
authorized by Maryland Individual Practice Association (MIPA),
"2See Ashe, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 685, at * 13.
126See id at *14.
127See id. at * 15.
12See Maryland Ins. Admin. v. Maryland Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc. 1999 Md. App.
LEXIS 199, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 6, 1999).
129See id
'
3 See id
13See id at *2.
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Lunz's health insurer. 132 Following surgery, MIPA learned Lunz had a
workers' compensation claim pending as well. 133 MIPA then notified
the orthopedic physicians' group that payment for Lunz would
be delayed. 3
In May of 1996, the orthopedic group filed a complaint with
Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) regarding the delay. 135 In
March of 1998, the MIA issued an order demanding MIPA pay
submitted health claims within thirty days regardless of their
connection to workers' compensation claims. 136 In July of 1998, MIPA
filed a petition for judicial review with the circuit court in Baltimore. 137
In February of 1999, the court overturned the MIA decision.
133
The appellate court first determined the proper standard of review
for decisions coming from an administrative agency. 139 The court held
a review of an administrative decision to be the same as if from the
circuit court.140 Therefore, the decision itself must be reviewed, and
the findings of fact accepted. 
14 1
The appellate court then turned to statutory interpretation to decide
if Sections 19-710.1 and 19-712.1 of the Maryland Code applied in the
instant matter.142  These two sections, in part, required health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) to pay health care providers for
covered services within thirty days of receipt of a claim. 43 The court
determined a workers' compensation claim was not a "covered
service," and thus, the thirty day limit for payment did not apply in this
situation.144 The court then examined the good faith exception to
Section 19-712.1.145 This exception allows payment to be delayed
1'2see id
"'
33See MarylandIns. Admin, 1999 Md. App. LEXIS 199, at *2.
'3See id.
"
35
see id.
'
36See id. at *3.
'7See id.
'See id
139See MarylandIns. Admin., 1999 Md. App. LEXIS 199, at *5.
4'"See it
141See it
'
42See it at *9.
14'See it
'44See Maryland Ins. Admin., 1999 Md. App. LEXIS 199, at * 12.
14'See it
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longer than thirty days if the claim is in dispute due to a question of
whether the claim is proper. 146
Applying the good faith exception, because the claim was in
dispute as to the identity of the proper payor, the court held that it did
not have to be paid within thirty days. 14 However, an HMO in the
future could only deny payment within the thirty days if they
investigated the claim, and made a good faith determination the claim
was not covered.1 48  Maryland Ins. Admin. v. Maryland Individual
Practice Assoc., Inc. 1999 Md. App. LEXIS 199, *1 (Md Ct. Spec. App.
Dec. 6, 1999).
Insurance Company Ordered to Cover Breast Reduction
Surgery Where Plan was Improperly Interpreted
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska ordered a
health insurance company to cover breast reduction surgery after a
findin the company had improperly interpreted the language of the
plan.'F
After experiencing neck and back pain, plaintiff consulted with
her physician and was diagnosed with bilateral hypertrophy of the
breast or enlarged breasts. The treating physician recommended
bilateral breast reduction surgery and referred plaintiff to a plastic
surgeon. 5 ' Plaintiff attempted to receive approval for breast reduction
surgery and was denied pre-certification. 52 Defendant insurance
company claimed the requested breast reduction surgery was not
covered under the health care plan (Plan), and although previously
payments had been made for such surgery for other patients, such
payments were erroneous. 153  The language of the Plan provided
'46See id at *13.
'
47See id.14'See id at * 14.
149See Milone v. Exclusive Healthcare, Inc., No. 8:98CV274 1999, 1999 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 20064, at *28 (Neb. Dec. 30, 1999).
"
5 See id at *4.
'See id
'
2See id at * 1-2.
"S3See i d at *4.
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payment would not be made for breast reduction surgery not related to
cancer. 1
54
In determining whether the insurance company's interpretation of
the Plan was reasonable the court applied five factors, including
whether:
(1) the interpretation was consistent with the goals of the Plan;
(2) the interpretation conflicted with substantive or procedural
requirements of the Employee Retirement Insurance Security
Act (ERISA);
(3) the interpretation rendered any language of the Plan
meaningless or internally inconsistent;
(4) the interpretation was contrary to the clear language of the
Plan; and
(5) the company had interpreted the relevant terms
consistently.1 55
The first requirement was satisfied in that the insurance company
interpreted the Plan in a manner consistent with the goals of the Plan.i16
The court found the relevant goals of the Plan were providing benefits
for those services covered and providing services for those that are
medically necessary.1 57  The process of determining coverage
employed by the company included making a decision first as to
whether a service is excluded from the Plan and then as to whether the
service was medically necessary. 158 This method, according to the
court was consistent with both the aforementioned goals and the goals
set forth by ERISA.'! 9
'5See Milone 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20064, at *4.
'"
5 See id
'
55See id at * 10.
f See id
'
15 See id
159See Milone, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20064, at * 11.
2000]
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Next the court looked at the interpretation of the language in the
Plan and determined the term "medically necessary" was ambiguous.16
0
The court also determined the language in the exclusion, which denied
coverage for "breast augmentation or reduction which is not associated
with cancer of the breast," confusing in light of physician testimony
that breast augmentation to achieve symmetry after cancer related
surgery was not technically a form of treating cancer.'16 Thus the court
determined the use of the term "medical necessity" rendered the term
meaningless.
162
Next, the court determined the company's interpretation of the
Plan to be inconsistent.1 63 In reaching this conclusion the court focused
on the fact in the past patient requests for breast reduction absent a
claim of cancer, were granted pre-certification. 164 While the court
recognized the policies relied on in these previous cases were distinct,
it rested its conclusion on the fact the language contained therein was
identical. 165
Finally, the court found the company's interpretation inconsistent
with the clear language of the Plan.166- The court reiterated the primary
reason was the fact the medical necessity standard was utilized during
the decision making process of refusing plaintiffs request and also
accepting previous identical requests. 167
Since the requisite factors for proper interpretation of a health care
plan were not satisfied, the court found for the plaintiff and ordered
defendant to provide coverage to her for breast reduction surgery.
168
Milone v. Exclusive Healthcare, Inc., No. 8:98CV274 1999, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20064 (Neb. Dec. 30, 1999).
'6See iii at *15-17.
16'See id at * 12-14.
'
62 ee id at*21.
63See id. at *25, 26.
'6See Milone, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20064, at *23-25.
16SSee id at *23-25.
166See id. at *25-26.167See id
'
68See id. at *28.
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LICENSE TO PRACTICE
To Carry Out an Injunction, One Must Prevail on the Merits
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's decision
granting plaintiff physician's preliminary injunction to restore his staff
privileges with defendant hospital.169 Because plaintiff was not likely
to prevail on the merits, the court stayed the injunction to withhold
physician's staff privileges. 1
70
While practicing medicine at defendant hospital, one of plaintiff
physician's patients died.17 1 Thereafter, defendant required plaintiff to
be monitored when he admitted patients, and later suspended his staff
privileges. 172 Upon further review, an outside agency recommended
plaintiff participate in an intensive training program.' 7 3
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the hospital, alleging racial
discrimination, antitrust violations, tortious interference with
contractual and business relationships, and conspiracy.'7 4  He also
moved for preliminary injunction to lift suspension of his staff
privileges. 75 The district court granted the injunction under the
agreement plaintiff would still be monitored. 176 Defendant appealed,
asking for a stayed enforcement of the injunction. 77
In order to grant a preliminary injunction, the court must consider
several factors.178 The factor at issue here was whether the plaintiff
was likely to prevail on the merits of his claim." 9 He offered no
concrete evidence to support his racial discrimination claim.12
Additionally, the antitrust claim was based on an unsupported
allegation the hospital wanted plaintiff out of the business in order to
169See Samuel v. Herrick Mem'l Hosp., 2000 U.S. App. Le:ds 586, at "19 (6th Cir.2000).
170See id. at * 18.
171See id. at *3.
"7See id.
"'See id. at *4.
"'See Samuel 200 U.S. App. LEXIS 5S6, at *5.
'7SSee i d
'76See id
'77See id. at *7.
"'SSee id. at *8.
179See Samuel, 200 U.S. App. LEXIS 586, at *8.5 0See id at *9.
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collect more revenue.181 His tortious interference claim did not survive
either since hospitals can appoint or remove its doctors without judicial
intervention. 182 Likewise, plaintiffs conspiracy claim was insufficient
because of lack of evidence.1
8 3
The court found the district court had erred in its balancing harms
analysis.'8 4 Originally the district court stated the hospital's revocation
of plaintiffs privileges would irreparably damage plaintiffs
reputation.185 However, the district court neglected to recognize the
harm to the defendant if plaintiff was allowed to practice. 186 Therefore,
because of the unlikelihood of plaintiff prevailing on the merits, and the
district court's incorrect balance of harms, the court stayed the
injunction and plaintiff's privileges were not restored. 8 7 Samuel v.
Herrick Mem'l Hosp., 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 586 (6th Cir.2000).
MEDICAL MALPRATICE
Medical Malpractice Testimony, Unconsented Surgery,
and Inappropriate Standard of Care Essential
for a Medical Malpractice Claim
The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed a trial court's decision resulting
in a directed verdict in favor of defendant physician.188 Plaintiff patient
failed to carry her burden of proof in a medical malpractice suit.' "
Plaintiff patient required emergency surgery on her colon and a
temporary colostomy.1 9 Approximately six months later, defendant
recommended reversing the colostomy. 191 Complications arose after
'"See id at *9.
'8See id. at *11.
...See id. at * 16.
'"See Samuel, 200 U.S. App. LEXIS 586, at *16-17.
'"See id. at * 17.
"S6See id.
'"TSee id. at * 17.
'
88See Dean v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6169, at *29 (Ohio 1999).
'"
9See id.
1
'9See id. at *3.
191See id
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the second surgery, where plaintiff developed a leak in her colon,
resulting in massive infection. 192 As a result, plaintiff required
additional surgeries to rectify the situation.193
Plaintiff alleged medical malpractice, technical battery, and
inappropriate standard of care against defendant physician. 194 The trial
court entered a directed verdict in favor of defendant. 195 To overcome
a directed verdict, a plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to prove
other reasonable minds would not have reached the same
conclusions. 19
6
Because plaintiff did not provide expert testimony demonstrating
the physician failed to act in a manner similar to that of other similarly
situated physicians, the medical malpractice claim failed.'97 Plaintiff's
technical battery claim failed because she had signed two legitimate
consent forms obtained in a legitimate manner. 198 Furthermore,
plaintiff never contested the consent forms.' 99 Plaintiff further argued
the wrong standard of care was used.2 ° She claimed the subjective
laparoscopic surgeon standard was used, instead of the general surgeon
standard of care.201 However, her own expert witness testified both
standards were the same.202 Therefore, plaintiff failed to prove this
issue.203
Because plaintiff failed to prove medical malpractice, technical
battefy, and application of the wrong standard of care, the court
affirmed the directed verdict in favor of the defendant.264 Dean v.
Akron Gen. Med Ctr., 1999 Ohio App. LESX 6169 (Ohio 1999).
'9see id at *7.
193See Dean, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6169, at *7.
'94See id. at*9
195See id.
1
'9See id
'97See id. at *10.
'
98See Dean, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6169, at* 13.
'99See id. at *8.
20
"See id. at *23.
270 See ia
'nSee id. at *24.
2"'See Dean, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6169, at *21.
2
°4See id. at *29.
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Physical Therapists Have a Duty to Administer Pre-Employment
Physicals According to the Accepted Standard, Even in the
Absence of a Physician-Patient Relationship
The Court of Appeals of Washington held a physical therapist had a
,duty of care to those persons on whom he or she conducted pre-
employment physicals, even though no physician-patient relationship
existed.20 5
As part of his job application, plaintiff was sent to defendant's
Medical Center to have a pre-employment physical performed by a
physical therapist 20 6  Plaintiff signed a waiver releasing both the
therapist and the medical center from any injury liability resulting from
the physical.207 During the physical plaintiff was required to lift a
weight bending at the waist with his knees locked; this caused him
immediate back and leg pain.
20 8
The court found a motion for summary judgment was improper
because an issue of fact existed; the therapist contended the test was
properly conducted, while plaintiff's expert witnesses declared the
therapist's description of the test revealed it was not administered in the
proper and accepted way.20 9  The court held a physician-patient
relationship was not required to claim failure of the state accepted
standard of care. 10 The state's Comprehensive Medical Malpractice
Act required any health care provider, including physical therapists, to
follow the accepted standard of care in providing medical care or
treatment. 21 Since this statute was applicable, the physical therapist
had a duty to perform the pre-employment physical on the patient
within the accepted standard of care.
205See EcIbode v. Chec. Med. Ctrs., Inc., 984 P. 2d 436, 472 (Wash. 1999).
206see id. at 437.
207See id.208See id.2
°9See id. at 438.21
°See Eelbode, 984 P.2d at 438.211See id at 467 (citing RCW 7.70 (Laws of 1975-76,2nd Ex.Sess., § 6-13)).212See id. at 439.
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The second issue addressed by the court was an exculpatory
agreement signed by the patient prior to the physical.213 The court held
although the language in the waiver would have covered negligence
with the therapist or the medical center, the contract was unenforceable
and void because it was violative of public policy.214 Eelbode v.Chec
Med Ctrs., Inc., 984 P. 2d 436 (Wash. 1999).
MENTAL HEALTH
Claim of Negligence for Failure to Warn of Possible Harm
not Viable in the Absence of a Foreseeable Threat
to a Specified Victim
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held a claim of negligence
for failure to warn of a psychiatric patient's propensity for violence
failed since the injured was outside the zone of danger, and therefore
the requisite element of a foreseeable danger to a specific person did
not exist.
1
Plaintiff, representative of the estate of his mother, brought a
medical malpractice suit against defendant physician and hospital.2 16
The complaint arose when an involuntarily admitted patient, upon
refusal of medication at a psychiatric hospital, struck a nurse who fell
and subsequently knocked down decedent who was at the time a patient
in the hospital.217 Upon falling, decedent suffered a broken hip and
died as a result of complications arising from hip surgery.21 The trial
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the theory
plaintiff failed to make out a viable claim for negligence.
219
The court considered the issue of whether a state statute
prohibiting liability against a mental health provider in the absence of
213See id. at 440.
2t4See id.
215See Falk v. Southern Md. Hosp., No. 1924, 1999 Md. App. LFXS 203, at 'S-lI (Md.
Dec. 7, 1999).2 16See id at*1.
217See id218See id219See id
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knowledge of a propensity for violence and a direct threat to a specified
individual applied in this instance.220 In assessing whether these two
requisite factors were present, the court focused on the fact that the
injuring behavior was not foreseeable.2 1  The court invoked the
Palsgrafp doctrine and applied it here, noting the decedent in this case
was not a "readily identifiable victim" because her injury resulted
indirectly from a direct injury to the nurse and was therefore outside the
zone of danger.2Z
The court recognized the injuring patient in this case had a record
of violent behavior and had previously behaved aggressively toward
both staff and other patients. 24  The court concluded this did not
establish a claim against the physician or hospital since there was not
enough evidence to show the injuring patient had informed the
defendants of an intent to harm.225 Falk v. Southern Md. Hosp., No.
1924, 1999 Md App. LEXIS 203 (Md. Dec. 7, 1999).
NEGLIGENCE
Doctrine ofRes Ipsa Loquitur Applies Where Oxygen Mask
Catches on Fire During Electrocautery Procedure
The Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fifth District, held the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applied where an oxygen mask caught on fire during
surgery involving use of an electrocautery unit, under defendant
physician's control, that emitted sparks.2 6
In January of 1995 plaintiff, now deceased, underwent a right
carotid endarterectomy, a procedure performed on a patient's right face
and neck. 7 Part of plaintiff's anesthesia involved the administration
220See Falk 1999 Md. App. LEXIS 203, at *4.
22'See id at *6-7.
m2 See generally Palsgrafv. Long Island RIL Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
2
zSee Falk, 1999 Md. App. LEXIS 203, at *8.
z24See id at *10-11.
22'See id at *11.
226See Gold v. Ishak M.D., No. 64A05-9809-CV-479, 1999 Ind. App. LEXIS 2180, at
*23-24 (Ind. Dec. 15, 1999).
227See id at *2.
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of oxygen through a mask which did not create an air tight seal since
the mask only came in one size. s To cauterize the blood vessels
during surgery, the physician used an electrocautery unit that emitted
sparks? 9 The plaintiff's face was covered by, drapes in such a way that
only the anesthesiologist had a view of it. During the surgery the
oxygen mask caught on fire and plaintiff suffered bums to his face and
chest 23
1
Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim and was denied
summary judgment.? 2 Defendants were then granted a directed verdict
on the grounds plaintiff had failed to present evidence of a breach of
the standard of care.?33 The court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
and its common sense exception did not apply. 4
On appeal, the court decided the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did
apply in this situation, because the facts or circumstances
accompanying the injury were such as to raise a presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant 35 The court noted, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, an inference of negligence will arise
where: "(1) the injuring instrumentality is shown to be under the
management or exclusive control of the defendant or his servants and
(2) the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have management of the injuring instrumentality
use proper care.1
236
The court determined the requisite element of control was present
in this case, in that the electrocautery unit and oxygen mask were the
injuring elements and were indeed under the exclusive control of
defendant medical providers.23 7  The court noted the concept of
exclusive control was a broad one. 38 The plaintiff did not need to
show the existence of other possibilities, but rather that the injury could
22sSee id at*3.
229See id
20See d at *5.
23See Gold, 1999 Ind. App. LEXIS 2180, at *5-6.
232see id. at * 1.
23See id.
2MSee id at*6.
23See id at *7, *9.
26Gold, 1999 Ind. App. LEXIS 2180, at *10.
237See id at* 13.23SSee id. at *11.
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be traced to a specific element, and defendants were the cause of that
element.239 Next, the court found the accident was not one which
would have happened in the ordinary course of things if the physicians
had used proper care.24 In coming to this conclusion the court pointed
out the risk of fire here was great since the mask did not produce an
airtight seal.24' Thus the court concluded the elements of res ipsa
loquitur were satisfied, and consequently an inference of negligence
was present.
242
The court declined to accept defendants' argument the jury should
not be permitted to make a decision based on common sense because
the procedure was complicated and thus required expert testimony for
proper explanation. 243  The court stated such expert testimony is
required only when the issue of care is beyond the understanding of a
lay person.244 The court found, in this instance, a lay person could
understand the fact a fire could occur during a procedure where an
instrument, which emitted sparks was placed near an oxygen source.
245
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's denial of summary
judgment for the plaintiff.246 Gold v. Ishak MD., * No. 64AO5-9809-
CV-479, 1999 Ind App. LEXS 2180 (nd. Dec. 15, 1999).
Leaving Part of a Medical Instrument Inside a Patient's
Body Falls Within Res Ipsa Loquitor Negligence and
Does Not Require Expert Testimony
The Court of Appeals of Texas partially reversed a Texas District Court
summary judgment holding no issue of fact resulted from the exclusion
of expert testimony of a severed defendant, and remaining defendants
were not negligent.247
239See a at*11, *12.
24 0See idt at * 13.
24
'See Gold, 1999 Ind. App. LEXIS 2180, at *15.242See id.
243See id at * 18.
244See Gold, 1999 Ind. App. LEXIS 2180, at *18.245See id at * 19.
246See id. at *24.247See Steinkamp v. Arreola, No. 08-98-00425-CV, 1999 WL 740785, at *1 (Tex.App.-
El Paso Sep. 23, 1999).
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A nurse, employed by a home health agency, inserted a catheter
into patient's arm as part of medical treatment and the catheter
fragmented.248 The patient required surgery to have the fragmented
catheter removed.249 Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint that
initially named the company that manufactured the catheter as a
defendant' 0
The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment and
severance on behalf of the defendant catheter manufacturer.251 Plaintiff
subsequently relied on evidence obtained from defendant
manufacturer's summary judgment motion in answering the summary
judgment motion filed by the defendant nurse. 2 However, the trial
court struck the evidence on the basis the defendant manufacturer's
claim had been severed and the evidence was a part of that action,
53
On appeal, the court held the evidence was stricken in error and more
than a scintilla of evidence regarding the fragmented catheter existed,
therefore summary judgment was in error on those issues.254
Regarding negligence, the court held the res ipsa loquitor
exception applied and medical expert testimony was not needed to
determine that leaving part of a medical instrument inside a patient was
negligent.255  The court, however, found no merit in plaintiff's
contention her thoracic syndrome condition was linked to the catheter
fiagmentation,256 Steinkamp v. Arreola, [___ S. W.3d.J_ No. 02-98-
00425-CV, 1999 WL 740785, 1, (Tex.App.-El Paso Sep. 23, 1999).
24SSee id.
249See d 
2"See id
2'See id
2'2See Steinkamp, 1999 WL 740785, at *1.
23See id
'2See id. at *2.
s'S3 ee id. at *4.
2SSee id at *6.
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The One-Year Statute of Limitation for Medical Claims did not
Apply Because the Plaintiff's Injury was Ancillary, and not a
Necessary Part of the Medical Treatment
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling a plaintiff's
negligence claim was not medical, therefore the one-year statute
limitations did not apply.257  Thus, the trial court did not err in
disallowing the defendant doctor's motion for leave to file an amended
answer asserting the one-year statute of limitations as a defense.
258
The plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant
because while she was attempting to leave the office without assistance
after her physical therapy, the door hit her causing her to fall.25 9 The
physician sought to amend his answer to the complaint in order to
assert the one-year statute of limitations as a defense to the
allegations.260 He argued the action was a medical action, thus the one-
year statute of limitations applied.26' The trial court denied the
motion.2
62
The court held the plaintiff did not file a medical malpractice
claim, just a negligence claim.2 63 The injuries were not incurred as a
result of any medical treatment.26 The plaintiff was leaving the office265
after her physical therapy session was finished. The plaintiff's injury
resulted from negligent maintenance of the doctor's property.26 6 She
was not accompanied by any employee of the physician. Therefore,
because the plaintiff's claim was not medical and thus subject to the
one-year statute of limitation, the trial court was correct in disallowing
257See Tayerle v. Hergenroeder, No. 98-G-2195, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5931, at *1
(Ohio Dec. 10, 1999).218See id at *7.
2gSee id at *2.
26°See idL at *3.26'See id
262See Tayerle, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5931, at *3.
'6See id at *4.
26See id at *5.265See i d
26See i d at *6.267See Tayerle, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5931, at *7.
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the motion to file an amended answer.26 Tayerle v. Hergenroeder, No.
98-G-2195, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5931 (Ohio Dec. 10, 1999).
A Patient May Find Negligence On the Part of a Medical Facility
For Actions By a Third Person In Specific Situations
The Supreme Court of Virginia held a patient harmed while under the
care of a medical facility may hold the facility liable for actions of a
third person if sufficient negligence is pled.269
Plaintiff filed a third amended motion for judgment against
defendant for medical negligence because of a breach of duty to her
when she was a psychiatric patient in one of defendant's facilities.270
Plaintiff had a history of bipolar disorder, and other psychiatric
problems stemming from sexual molestation as a child and sexual
assault as a teenager.271 She was admitted to a hospital affilated with
defendant, and while a patient there she was visited by an unauthorized
male whom she alleged sexually assaulted her.272 The medical staff at
the hospital documented the coming and going of the visitor, but never
took any action to protect the plaintiff2 '3 Investigation revealed the
visitor was a fellow patient with a history of sexual misconduct, and
was known to be HIV positive.2 74 Defendant medical facility neither
informed police nor made any other record of the assault. 275
Plaintiff filed an action claiming negligence for failure to protect
her from the intentional acts of a third person, for failure to control the
actions of the third person, and for both negligent and intentional
affliction of emotional distress. 76 Upon plaintiffs filing of her third
amended motion for judgment, defendant filed demurrers, and asserted
2See id
29See Delk v. ColumbiafHCA Healthcare Corp., 2000 WL 26988, at *1 (Va. Jan. 14,
2000).
27OSee id
27 1See id at *2.
272see d
=See id
274See Delk, 2000 WL 26988, at *2.275See id
276See id at * 1.
2000]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
plaintiff had named no viable cause of action.277 The circuit court
upheld defendant's motion.278 Plaintiff appealed. 79
In order for defendants to be liable, a special relationship towards
the plaintiff needed to exist.280  The court believed this necessary
relationship existed because defendants knew plaintiff was a danger to
herself and others, and had a long history of psychiatric problems.
281
Defendants even listed plaintiff as a high risk patient. Therefore, the
court held the sexual assault incident was reasonably foreseeable. 28 3 It
found plaintiffs pleadings asserted sufficient facts to support her
contention a special relationship existed.2 ' The court asserted in order
for the necessary special relationship to exist, all plaintiff had to do was
allege facts which, if proven, "would show that the defendant had
'taken charge' of a third person... ,,28s The court found plaintiff's
pleadings sufficiently asserted defendants had not controlled the third
person who allegedly assaulted her.
286
The court affirmed the lower court's judgment against plaintiff on
the complaint of emotional trauma because of a lack of a causal
connection, and a failure on her part to describe the trauma, but
overturned the lower court on the remainder of the judgment.287 Delk
v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 2000 WL 26988 *1 (Va. Jan. 14,
2000).
An On-Call Emergency Room Physician Does Not Need to Be
Present to Establish a Patient-Physician Relationship
The Court of Appeals of Missouri held an on-call surgeon owed a duty
to reasonably foresee patients might need emergency care and,
277See id.
278See id
279See Delk, 2000 WL 26988, at * 1.280See id. at *4.28
'See id.
282See id.
283See id.
284See Delk, 2000 WL 26988, at *5.
26See id. at *6.
2'7See id at *7.
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therefore, he should have taken measures to notify the hospital of his
absence.2
88
Defendant, Dr. Joseph Corrado, was the on-call general surgeon at
the Audrain Medical Center (AMC) on November 4, 1 9 94 .2s9 He also
needed to attend a medical conference in another town.2 90 Dr. Corrado
made arrangements with another physician, who was not a general
surgeon, to take his place if an emergency arose.291 Plaintiff, Mrs.
Millard, was severely injured in an automobile accident later in the
morning of November 4, 1994.292 She was taken by ambulance to
AMC.2 93 The hospital attempted to page Dr. Corrado, but was
unsuccessful. 294  Over half an hour after the initial message, Dr.
Corrado called AMC and spoke with the physicians attending to Mrs.
Millard.295 The situation was discussed, and the decision was made to
transport plaintiff to the University of Missouri Medical Center in
Columbia for surgery.296 Mrs. Milard was subsequently transported to
Columbia, where surgery was performed on her two and a half hours
after she first arrived atAMC.
291
Plaintiff brought action against Dr. Corrado, claiming
negligence.298  Defendant physician filed a motion for summary
judgment based on the argument plaintiff had failed to establish the
necessary patient-physician relationship needed for a medical
negligence claim.299 The trial court granted the summary judgment
motion and plaintiff appealed. 00
The appellate court divided its analysis into two parts-general
negligence and medical negligence.30 1  For the general negligence
2 SSSee Millard v. Corrado, 1999 Mo. App. LEXS 2405, at *1 (Mo. Ct App. Dec. 14,
1999). 29See id at *2.
r9OSee id
2'See id
292See id
293See Millard, 1999 Mo. App. LEXIS 2405, at *3.
29See id at*4.29S5ee id
'25See id at *6.
297See Millarat 1999 Mo. App. LEXIS 2405, at *6.293See ic at *7.
2-'9See id at *7.
30 3See id
30'See id at *1S.
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claim analysis, the court evaluated the public policy considerations, and
the foreseeability of the harm.30 2 For the public policy considerations,
the court determined from prior decisions a standard of care existed for
emergency room personnel, including the rule that on-call surgeons
should arrive at the hospital within thirty minutes of being called.303
The court felt this created little burden.304 The court then quickly dealt
with the foreseeability of harm discussion by stating an emergency
room general surgeon could easily foresee the possibility of someone
needing his or her services while on-call.30 5  As a result of this
foreseeability, a duty existed.306 The court applied these principles to
the instant case and held public policy and the foreseeability of harm
created a duty on the part of defendant physician towards plaintiff.30 7
In addressing the medical negligence claim, the court discussed
primarily the issue of whether a patient/physician relationship could
exist between plaintiff patient and defendant physician.311 In general,
such a relationship is only created if the physician personally examines
the patient.309 The court looked to the Corbet test to determine if a
patient/physician relationship existed without a personal
examination.310 The Corbet test is as follows: "where the consultant
physician does not physically examine or bill the patient, a physician-
patient relationship can still arise where the physician is contractually
obligated to provide assistance in the patient's diagnosis or treatment
and does so." 311 The court applied this test to determine if there was
enough material question of fact to take this issue to a jury.312  It
determined enough question of fact existed.313
'°2SeeMillar, 1999 Mo. App. LEXIS 2405, at *12-13.3
°3See id at *12.3 4'See id
3'See id at * 13.
3°6See id
3'7See Miliar 1999 Mo. App. LEXIS 2405, at *14.
3'See id at * 18.3
°9See I d
3'See id at * 19.3 t tSee id at*20.
312See Millara 1999 Mo. App. LEXIS 2405, at *21.
MSee id at *29.
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Accordingly, the appellate court determined plaintiff properly
pleaded claims of both general negligence and medical negligence.
314
The court reversed the lower court's decision, and remanded the case
for further proceedings.315 Millard v. Corrado, 1999 Mo. App. LXIS
2405 at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1999).
When Trying to Prove Corporate Negligence on Behalf of a
Medical Facility, and not Medical Negligence, Expert
Medical Testimony is not Always Needed
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held no Medical expert is needed
to testify in a negligence action involving a medical facility when the
incident and the injury are close together in time, and easily apparent,
that the circumstances themselves justify allowing the case to go to a
jury.316
Plaintiff, Sybil Matthews, following the birth of a healthy baby,
underwent a tubal ligation? 17 After surgery, plaintiff fell from the
operating table, perhaps when she rose in an attempt to go to the
bathroom unattended. She alleged injury from both the fall, and a
nurse's attempt to grab her arm to break the fall.319 She subsequently
filed a complaint stating negligence on the part of the hospital.
320
During discovery there was a question of who would serve as
plaintiff's expert medical witness. 321 After plaintiff failed to produce
an expert witness to testify as to causation of the alleged injuries, the
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 32 The trial court
dismissed the case, claiming a medical malpractice action required a
medical expert to show causation.323 Plaintiff appealed.
3 24
3'4See id. at*27.
31sSee id at *30.
3"6See hatthews v. Clarion Hosp., 1999 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4109, at *22 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Dec. 8, 1999).7See id at *2.
31See id
3'19See id
320See id
3'See Matthews, 1999 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4109, at *4.
322See id at*l.
msee id/
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The appellate court did not see this action as one of medical
malpractice, but instead one of corporate negligence. 325 Nevertheless,
the court held if causation was not obvious the plaintiff had to produce
expert testimony the hospital's acts deviated from the accepted standard
of care.326 No expert testimony was required, however, when the cause
was obvious.
327
The court looked at cases involving both corporate negligence and
medical negligence in creating a rule for the instant case. 328 It held no
medical expert testimony was required in situations where "the
manifestation of the injury began almost immediately after the alleged
negligent act, and the injury complained of was the type one would
reasonably expect to result from the accident in question."329 The court
further held the instant case was in accordance with that rule.
330
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case
remanded for re-trial.33' Matthews v. Clarion Hosp., 1999 Pa. Super.
LEXIS 4109 at **22 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1999).
PROCEDURE
In Order to Comply With State Law, Plaintiff Affidavits
Must Include Applicable Standard of Care and How
Standard Was Breached
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's dismissal
because plaintiff patient failed to state the applicable standard of care,
and how the defendant nursing home departed from the standard when
she was not restrained and injured herself.332 The state statute and
3 24See id.32See id
32See Matthews, 1999 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4109, at *2.327See id32 1d. at *11.3291d. at*17, *18.330See id. at *21331See i d332See Tousignant v. St. Louis County, Minn., 602 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Minn. Nov. 30,
1999).
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precedent case law required plaintiff to file an affidavit, which among
other things had to state the applicable standard of care, the acts
defendant committed to breach this standard, and an outline of the
chain of causation that led to the injury.333 The court also held the
lower court did not abuse its discretion by denying an extension of time
to allow her to add to the affidavit.
3 34
The patient brought a medical malpractice negligence claim
against the nursing home alleging that due to the nursing home's failure
to restrain her, she fell and was injured. 35 The patient filed an affidavit
in a timely fashion as required by statute, but the lower court found the
affidavit was lacking and dismissed the claim.336 The patient argued
the affidavit should have been considered by the lower court in
conjunction with a Department of Health report of the incident.337 The
court disagreed, holding the affidavit did not articulate the standard of
care and the facts showing the violation of the standard were
inadequate. 338  The affidavit only contained broad, conclusory
statements.
339
Furthermore, the court held the lower court did not err in
disallowing an extension of time to the patient so she could add to the
affidavit.34 The court noted the patient did not ask the lower court for
an extension to cure the affidavit's deficiencies.341 Also, in order to
allow an extension of time according to statute, the party requesting the
extension needed a reasonable excuse for any defects.342 Tousignant v.
St. Louis County, Minrm, 602 N. W..2d 882 (Minn. Nov. 30, 1999).
333See id. at 885.334See id at 886.
335See id at 884.336See id337See Tousignant, 602 N.W.2d at 886.338See id
339See id
34OSee id at 887.341 
ee id at 886.342See Tousignant, 602 N.W.2d at 887.
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RIGHT TO PRIVACY
When the Health of a First Patient is Possibly Affected by the
Health of a Second Patient, the Medical Records of the Second
Patient may only be Reviewed In Camera
The Supreme Court of Mississippi held a patient has the right to keep
their medical records confidential, even if the health of another patient
is at issue.343 The medical records may, however, be viewed in camera
to determine if another patient's health is at risk.3 "
Plaintiff, Sammy Johnson, and his wife, Deena Johnson, had a
daughter, Kayla Johnson on December 6, 1995. 341 Shortly after the
birth, one of the nurses at Baptist Memorial Hospital (BMH)
accidentally took Kayla to the wrong mother (Mrs. X) for breast
feeding.346  Several hours later the Johnson's were notified of this
mistake.347 The hospital, however, refused to disclose the identity of
the woman who breast fed Kayla.
348
Plaintiff filed a negligence action against BMH for the nurse's
mistake, and the plaintiffs attorney served interrogatories and requests
for production on BMH, in part requesting the identity of Mrs. X, and
full access to her medical records.349  BMH filed a Motion for
Protective Order to prevent the disclosure."' Plaintiffs then filed a
Motion to Compel BMH to produce the identity. 35' BMH filed a
response claiming Mrs. X's identity was medically privileged
information.352
Officials at BMH notified Mrs. X of this ongoing litigation, and
she affirmatively asserted her medical privilege to confidentiality.
353
343See Baptist Mem'l Hosp. v. Johnson, 2000 Miss. LEXIS, at* 1 (Miss. Jan. 6,2000).
344See iL34SSee id. at *3.34See id34 7See id34
'See Baptist Mem' Hosp., 2000 Miss. LEXIS, at *3.349 See id3
s0See id351See id352See id at *4.3
"See Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 2000 Miss. LEXIS, at *4.
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Mrs. X did, however, allow a portion of her medical records to be
turned over to the Johnsons.35  The trial court held a hearing to
determine the Motion to Compel.355 The court ordered the identity of
Mrs. X disclosed, and ordered the production of all medical records
relating to Mrs. X.316 The trial court then entered an interlocutory
appeal to the supreme court for a ruling on the scope of the patient-
physician privilege, and the appropriateness of full disclosure of the
records. 357
The supreme court first reviewed the law and public policy
relating to compelling the identity of a fact witness, even if it might
violate the witness's rights. 358 The court saw Mrs. X as a fact witness
to the potential negligence of BMH, therefore her identity had to be
revealed.359 The court then turned to the issue of what medical records
should be disclosed to the Johnsons.3 60 The court considered this an
issue of first impression in Mississippi; therefore, for guidance, the
court reviewed the history of the laws concerning the patient-physician
privilege in the state.361 The court, on review, determined that any
revelation of records that would allow someone to know both the
identity of the person, and their ailments would be a violation of the
person's rights.362 Furthermore, this disclosure was only acceptable if
public policy demanded such.36
The court held the most reasonable solution was an in camera
review of Mrs. X's records.364 The court remanded the case to the trial
court and ordered the medical records of Mrs. X reviewed in camera by
the trial judge to determine if the health of the baby was at risk.365 The
court also held the identity of Mrs. X to be revealed to the Johnsons
3MSee id
355See id356See id357See icL at*7.35See Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 2000 Miss. LEXIS, at *7.3
"S9 ee id at *8.3
'°See id at *9.3615ee id36See id at *14.
363See Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 2000 Miss. LEXIS, at * 14.
3"See id at*16.365see id
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because she was a fact witness in the litigation. 36 Baptist Mem'l Hosp.v. Sammy Johnson, 2000 Miss. LEXIS5 *1 (Miss. Jan. 6, 2000).
STAFF PRIVILEGES
Physicians Need a Direct Contractual Relationship with an Eligible
Health Center to Qualify for Medical Malpractice Coverage Under
the Health Centers Assistance Act
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed defendant was not
considered an employee under the federally supported Health Centers
Assistance Act (Act).367 Because defendant had no contractual
relationship with an eligible health center, he was not eligible for their
malpractice insurance.
368
Plaintiff patient claimed defendant physician negligently
performed medical services during her pregnancy.369 The key issue
was whether defendant was an employee under the Act at the time this
alleged malpractice occurred.370
Defendant entered into a contract with Capstone Health Services
Foundation. 371 Through this contract, defendant became a member of
University of Alabama and Capstone agreed to provide liability
insurance for defendant.372 Capstone contracted with West Alabama to
do so.373 After suit was filed against defendant for malpractice, he
removed the case to federal court, believing he was covered under the
Act.37
4
Defendant contended despite an explicit contract with West
Alabama, he was still included under the Act.375 He claimed it was
3
'See id.367See Dedrick v. Youngblood, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 374, at *9 (1Ilth Cir. 2000).36 See id. at *8.
169See id. at *4.370See id. at *2.
17'See id. at *3.
372See Dedrick; 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 374, at *3.
373See id.
374See id. at *4.37
'See id.
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sufficient he performed services for a public health organization
pursuant to a contract.376 However, the court held the contractor was
an individual directly contracted with a particular entity.
377
When interpreting a federal statute, the court must strictly construe
the verbiage so as not to expand a waiver of sovereign immunity.
3 7
Therefore, because defendant never specifically contracted with West
Alabama, he was not considered an employee under the Act 379 As a
result, the malpractice action was remanded to state court.380 Dedrick
v. Youngblooa 2000 US. App. LEXS 374 (11th Cir. 2000).
Physician Whose Staff Privileges were Suspended did not
have Standing to Sue Under Title VII Because She
was not an Employee
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a
United States District Court motion for summary judgment on behalf of
a hospital, holding a physician suspended of staff privileges did not
have standing under Title VII because she was not a hospital
employee.3
81
Over a three and half year period the defendant hospital's Quality
Assurance Committee, Executive Committee, and Investigative
Committee, among other boards held various inquiries and meetings
regarding the lack of care provided hospital patients seen by plaintiff
physician.382 Statements from nurses, physicians, and plaintiff herself,
were considered during this evaluation which culminated in twenty-five
hours of hearings before the hospital's Judicial Review Committee.
38 3
The court found much of plaintiff s evidence had been "anecdotal
and inadmissible," and concerned instances that had occurred several
376 See id at *6.3
7See Dedrick 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 374, at *7.37SSee id. at *6.
379See id at *8.380See id381see Pamintuan, M.D. v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378, 380-SI (3d Cir.
1999). 3
'See id at 381.3MSee id at 389.
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years prior to this action.384 Accordingly, the court held no reasonable
finder of fact could find discriminatory reasons for physician's
suspension of privileges.3
85
The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs
second claim of disparate treatment under the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act (HCQIA), holding defendant hospital's inquiry to be
reasonable and motivated by the furtherance of quality health care.3 86
Pamintuan, M.D. v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378 (3d Cir.
1999).
TORTS
Plaintiff did not meet her Burden of Proof Because she Could not
Link the Vaccination to her Child's Hearing Loss
The Court of Federal Claims denied the plaintiff mother a favorable
determination and compensation to her child under the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.387 The court denied
compensation to the plaintiff's child because the court was only faced
with a small amount of reliable medical evidence and the plaintiff
failed to show a nexus between the vaccination and the child's hearing
loss. 388
The plaintiff filed a claim for compensation under federal statute
alleging her son's hearing loss was caused by an allergic reaction to a
vaccination.38 9  However, there was evidence family members had
thought the child may have had hearing difficulties before the
vaccination was administered. 390 Additionally, defendant's medical
expert noted there was no research linking the vaccination with hearing
3MSee id at 387.3 See id at 388.3
"
6See Pamintuan, 192 F. 3d 378, 390.3S7See Zimmer v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Serv., No. 97-0861V,
1999 U.S. Claims LEXIS 289, at *42 (Dec. 2, 1999).
Ussee id at*16, *18.
"MSee id at *4.
3
'9See id at *6.
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loss, and no proof the vaccination played any role in the child's hearing
loss.39
1
The court held because there was a paucity of medical research
connecting the vaccination to hearing loss, and because the plaintiff
could not prove the nexus between the vaccination and her child's
hearing loss, she could not be granted relief.392 The court stated a two-
prong test had to be met in order for the plaintiff to prevail. 393 First, the
plaintiff needed to provide a reputable medical theory that linked the
vaccine to the hearing loss.3 94 Second, the plaintiff had to prove the
vaccine actually caused the hearing loss in her child.395 The court
decided the plaintiff had failed to meet either burden.396 Specifically
the inference the plaintiff's child suffered from hearing loss due to the
vaccine was speculative and there was evidence the child had a hearing
impairment for some time before the vaccine was administered.3P 7
Thus, since the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof she was
denied relief.398 Zimmer v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and
Human Serv., No. 97-0861V, 1999 US. Claims LEXIS 289 (Dec. 2,
1999).
Damage for Emotional Distress not Recoverable for Fear
of Contracting AIDS When Exposure not Demonstrated
In an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth
District, held a plaintiff could not recover damages for the fear of
contracting AIDS without establishing physical injury, showing the
virus likely to be present, or demonstrating the channel for transmitting
the disease.399
39 1 See id at *9.39See Zimmer, 1999 U.S. Claims LEXIS 289, at *18.
393see id at*13.
394See i d395See i d
396See id at *18.
397See id.
39See Zimmer, 1999 U.S. Claims LEXIS 289, at '18.
399See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hagan, No. 98-1463, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 16194, at
*2 (Fla. Dist. CL App. Dec. 3,1999).
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Plaintiffs won a jury award for medical expenses and loss of
consortium for defendant's negligent infliction of emotional distress.
400
Both parties appealed.4 °'
The two plaintiffs had shared a bottle of Coca-Cola, found it tasted
bad and discovered what appeared to be a used condom floating in the
bottle.402 Both testified they feared exposure to the AIDS virus.40 3
They presented no medical or scientific evidence that HIV was or could
be present in the Coca-Cola.404 Although they had an HIV test at a
hospital emergency room, they did not follow-up with their own
physicians.40 5 Furthermore, they presented no evidence they sought or
needed professional counseling because of their fears.40 6  Later, a
chemist from Coca-Cola's quality assurance department testified the
object in the bottle appeared at first to be a condom, but was actually a
mold that developed in beverages that lost their carbonation.407
The court considered the effect of Florida's "impact rule" in
negligence suits, which allows compensation only for emotional
distress arising from physical injuries. 40 8  The rule applied to
contaminated food cases, requiring proof of physical illness.40 9
Plaintiffs had not experienced physical reactions or physical illness,
and their emotional distress arose from the fear of contracting AIDS,
not from the object in the beverage bottle.410 Therefore, there could be
no recovery under Florida law.41' The court also found no case law in
other states granting damages for the fear of contracting AIDS in
similar situations.412 Most states required the plaintiff to show the fear
was reasonable-either through actual presence of the virus or the
medical or scientific possibility that it could have been transmitted by
4
°,see id. at *2.
4°"See id.402See id. at *3.403See id. at *3.4
°4See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 16194, at *7.40 See id. at * 10.
4°6See id. at *10-11.
40 7See id. at *5-6.40
see id. at *10-12.409See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1999 Fia. App. LEXIS 16194, at * 11-17.41
°see id at *14-15.41
'See id. at*17.412See id. at *22.
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the method in question.413 Here, plaintiffs failed to establish the item
was contaminated or that ingesting the beverage was a way to contract
the disease.414  Therefore, their fear of contracting AIDS was
unreasonable.415 The court held there was no cause of action proved
against defendants and reversed the verdicts.416 Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Hagan, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 16194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 3,
1999).
Public Hospitals Lack Standing to Sue Tobacco Companies for
Recovery of Health Care Expenses for Treatment of Smokers
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington granted summary judgment to defendants in a suit brought
by public hospital districts in Washington state, seeking recovery for
costs of treating smoking-related diseases. 417 Plaintiffs used several
legal theories, including federal antitrust violations, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations,
fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, breach of special
duty to disclose health hazards, unjust enrichment, conspiracy,
violations of the state Consumer Protection Act, and public nuisance.
Plaintiffs alleged defendants conspired to promote smoking and
forced them to bear the costs of related medical care.4 19 Plaintiffs
sought recovery of the unreimbursed costs of the care and equitable and
injunctive relief4 20 At issue was whether their claims differed from
similar unsuccessful claims made by third party health care payers.
421
The court cited Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust
Fundv. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999) as fatal to the
413See id. at *23.4 4See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 16194, at *24415 ee id.
416See id at *26.
417Assoc. of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230
(W.D. Wash. 1999).4185ee id. at 1221.419See id.4205ee id.4218ee id. at 1222.
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hospital districts' case. 422 Oregon Laborers held the third party payers
failed to show a direct link between the tobacco companies' alleged
actions and plaintiffs' alleged damages. 423  The court assumed, for
purposes of reviewing the motion to dismiss, that smoking was
harmful, that defendants conspired to withhold this information from
the public, and that this affected plaintiffs' costs for treating smoking-
related illnesses.4
24
Both the Sherman Act and RICO claims require standing for
plaintiff to recover.425 Here, the court held smokers may have
experienced direct injury, but any injury to plaintiff was derivative and
too remote to allow recovery.426  The Sherman Act also requires an
antitrust injury, in the form of restrained competition. 427 The court held
this could not exist because plaintiffs and defendants did not operate in
the same market.428 Similarly, RICO claims require a direct injury to
plaintiffs, and the court determined defendants' activities were not
targeted at plaintiffs, therefore no injury existed.429  The court
dismissed state law claims for fraudulent concealment and
misrepresentation, breach of special duty, unjust enrichment, violation
of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, nuisance, and conspiracy
using similar reasoning.430 The court concluded the hospital districts'
claims were derivative of harm experienced by their patients, and
defendants' actions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs'
alleged injuries.431 The court upheld defendants' motion to dismiss. 432
Association of Washington Public Hospital Districts v. Philip Morris
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
422See Assoc. of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1221
42'See id.424See id. at 1222-23.425See id. at 1223.426See id. at 1224.427See Assoc. of WasL Pub. Hosp. Dists., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
423See i d at 1226.429See i d at 1227-28.
43 See id at 1227-29.43
'See id at 1230.432See Assoc. of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Latex Allergy Upheld As Work-Related Injury
The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld a workers' compensation award to
defendant, a registered nurse.433 It affirmed latex-allergy was properly
defined as an on-the-job injury, not an industrial disease, which arose
from exposure to latex while employed at plaintiff hospital. 34
Defendant had worked at the hospital for five years when
symptoms of latex-allergy arose.435 She could not change her work
environment to avoid further exposure to latex, and quit a year later to
work for an insurance company.436 She then filed for and obtained
workers' compensation benefits for her latex-allergy, which was
determined to be an injury that caused permanent partial disability.!31
Her former employer appealed the award on three bases. First, it
argued the condition was an industrial disease, not an injury, and was
covered under a separate chapter of Iowa code.4 38 Second, it asserted
substantial evidence did not support the determination defendant's
employment had caused the injury.4 39 Finally, it said the evidence did
not support a 35 percent disability rating because defendant's new job
paid more than her old one. 40 The court ruled plaintiff waived its right
to raise its first issue by not presenting it until appeal." 1 It went on,
however, to analyze whether allergic reactions should, as a matter of
law, be considered injuries or industrial diseases." 2  It cited as
precedent its own broad definition of injury, several authorities, and
case law from other states recognizing allergies as work-related
injuries." 3
433See St. Luke's hosp. V. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Iowa 2000).
434See idL at 652.435See id. at 649.
435See id.
437See iii438see St. Luke's Hosp., 604 N.V.2d at 649.
439See aid at 649-50.
44sSee id. at 650.
44'See aid
442See iU
443SL Luke's Hosp., 604 N.W.2d at 650, citing Webb v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 141
P.2d 333 (N.M.1943), Hardin's Bakeries, Inc. v. Ranager, 64 So2d 705 (Miss. 1953),
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The court held defendant's expert witnesses had provided
substantial evidence to show a causal connection between her
employment and her injury.444 Finally, the court found compensation
for an unscheduled disability involves all factors that may bear on
employability, not just lost earnings ability.44s  Here, substantial
evidence showed defendant was unable to engage in many positions
similar to what she had at the hospital, and she therefore lost earning
capacity." 6 St. Luke's Hospital v. Gray, 604 N. W2d 646 (Iowa 2000).
Statutory Presumption of Compensabilty Rebutted Only With
Evidence Injury Was Not the Result of On the Job Activity
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held a hospital had not
properly rebutted a presumption of compensability where there was
evidence that injury was the result of on the job lifting.447
In 1990 plaintiff, a nurse, suffered multiple hernias subsequent to
lifting a patient with obesity, which was a part of her regular duties as
nurse on a bum unit.44 Plaintiff was advised to undergo surgery to
repair the hernias and to stop working.449 Plaintiff underwent
successful surgery and resumed full time employment as soon as she
was cleared to do so by her physicians.
450
At the compensation hearing, the question at issue was whether
plaintiff's condition was causally related to the lifting incident at
work.451 As plaintiff had a pre-existing hernia condition at the time of
the incident, her contention was the condition was aggravated by
Bidermann Industries Corp. v. Peterson, 655 So.2d 997 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994), and National
Underground Storage v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Durochia), 658 A.2d 1389 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1995).
44See id at 651.
445See id at 652.
'46See id
447See Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment. Serv., No.
97-AA-1 107,2000 WL 38470, at *7 (D.C. App. 2000).
448See i d at * 1-2.
449See id. at * 1450See id at * 2451See i d
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subsequent, repetitive, heavy lifting.452  The defendant hospital
stipulated that the statutory presumption of compensability had been
met by plaintiff, but further contended the presumption could be
rebutted by physician testimony that "a single lifting episode.. .was not
the cause of this patient's.. .hernia," and the injury was more likely the
result of gradual tissue stress over a long period of time.
4 53
The court first looked to the presumption of compensability under
which a plaintiff need only show some evidence of "(1) a disability,
and (2) a work-related event, activity, or requirement which has the
potential in resulting in or contributing to the.. .disability. ' 4A 4 The
defendant argued the hearing examiner failed to adequately discuss
findings of fact on all material issues involved in this presumption.
455
The court disagreed with this argument stating such a strict standard of
procedure did not exist for the hearing examiner and plaintiff had
satisfied the presumption requirements by alleging her disability was at
least in part the result of a work related injury. 56
The court looked next to the examiner's findings relevant to
whether the presumption was effectively rebutted by physician
testimony implying that the injury did not result solely from the
incident in question." The court noted such a presumption must be
rebutted by "substantial evidence that the disability did not arise out of
and in the course of employment."458 The court concluded the sole
evidence offered on this point, expert physician testimony, was
inconsistent and insufficient to rebut the presumption.459 However, the
court noted the plaintiff was not required to show the injury arose only
out of a single incident.460 To rebut the presumption successfilly the
hospital would have had to present evidence that the injury was
definitively not the result of the incident in question.461 Washington
452See Washington Hosp. Ctr., 2000 WL 38470, at *2.
4S4Ld at*3.
4S5See id at *3.4 6 ee id at *5.
457See Washington Hsp. Ctr., 2000 WL 38470, at *5.
45Sj
4SSee id at *6.
460See id46tSee id
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Hosp. Cr. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment. Serv., No. 97-
AA-1107, 2000 WL 38470 (D.C. App. 2000).
